internal memo one of Enrons key strategiescode-named Load Shiftwas to deliberately overstate the amount of energy its customers required. Reskilling, for Mr Skilling turned out not to be a technophobe after all. A lot of companies were doing that. Whether any or all of the tactics are legal will be the focus of considerable debate. Louise Kitchen, a young trader who was spearheading the firm's foray into Europe's liberalising gas and power markets, was an early advocate, emboldened by the success of a modest Internet effort at Enron's office in Scandinavia (which has long had liberalised energy markets). But neither Feinstein nor any other Democrats have suggested that there should be a criminal investigation in the Bush administrations efforts on behalf of the energy trader. In December 2000, as the crisis intensified, the capped price was 250 a megawatt-hour. The EnronOnline model that Ms Kitchen and her colleagues came up with was not based on an open platform, however. During and after the crisis Enron officials insisted they did nothing to exacerbate the situation.
Unlike, say, treasury bills, he reckons electricity and gas are not perfectly interchangeable commodities: their prices vary wildly by geographical market, for example, and they can fluctuate every few seconds. The documents describe this as traders taking 'advantage of arbitrage opportunities.'. Sometimes Enron would exploit California's emergency price caps, buying power at the capped price and then selling it at huge profit out of state, where there were ig markets forex avis no price caps. Every deregulating market follows this disintegration curve, explains Mr Skilling. THE energy business seems an unlikely place to look for a good Internet strategy. 6, 2000, Enron memo provides a powerful example: "Yesterday.